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The paper investigates price formation in a decentralized market with random matching.
Agents are assumed to have subdued social preferences: buyers, for example, prefer a
lower price to a higher one but experience reduced utility increases below a reference price
which serves as a common fairness benchmark. The strategic equilibrium reﬂects market
fundamentals, but it is markedly less sensitive to the buyer-seller ratio near the fair price
benchmark. Prices may be sticky around very dierent reference levels in markets with
otherwiseidenticalfundamentals. Theimpliedhistorydependenceturnsouttobemitigated
rather than exacerbated by friction.
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1. Introduction
Fair behavior in bilateral bargaining situations has been one of the most extensively re-
searched areas in microeconomics – experimentally and theoretically. Whether the robust
evidence that people are concerned with fairness in bilateral bargaining (see, e.g., Camerer
2003) has implications for interaction on markets, however, remains unclear. Early studies
by Kahneman et al. (1986), followed up by Kachelmeier et al. (1991) and Franciosi et al.
(1995), have demonstrated that there are fairness eects on markets. However, they have
been observed mainly as a transient phenomenon: the prices in the reported experiments
typically approach the standard competitive equilibrium as time passes and unsustainable
expectations are unwound. And many experimental studies have failed to ﬁnd signiﬁcant
fairnesseectsonmarketsaltogether. Intheirseminalpaper, FehrandSchmidt(1999, p.818)
summarize that
“...in competitive experimental markets with complete contracts, in which
a well-deﬁned homogenous good is traded, almost all subjects behave as
if they are only interested in their material payo. Even if the competitive
equilibriumimpliesanextremelyunevendistributionofthegainsfromtrade,
equilibrium is reached within a few periods.”
The experimental investigations referred to by Fehr and Schmidt mostly concern double
auctionsettings, andarethereforediculttointerpret: thezero-intelligencetraderresultsof
Gode and Sunder (1993) have highlighted the strong built-in tendency of double auctions to
reproduce the competitive equilibrium. Whether agents lose their concern for fairness when
they interact in market environments or if their social preferences are simply overwhelmed
by institutional structure is hard to discern. In fact, Brown et al. (2004) have recently
shown that social preferences can play an important role in the presence of contractual
incompleteness. Their experimental results complement empirical ﬁndings by Young and
Burke (2001) which testify to the importance of custom and focal division rules.
Many market forms other than double auctions are of practical interest. The search or
matching markets studied by Diamond and Maskin (1979), Mortensen (1982), or Rubinstein
and Wolinsky (1985) are cases in point. They feature prominently in labor, real estate and
monetary economics.1 A key property of these markets is that they temporarily involve
one-to-one interaction. This establishes a direct social relation and moreover creates leeway
for prices to reﬂect the attitudes towards risk, delay, and possibly fairness of any two trade
partners.
1See, e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) or Rogerson et al. (2005) for labor search models, Krainer and




unfavorable as well as unfairly favorable deals in the spirit of Fehr and Schmidt (1999),2 but
we stay rather close to standard individualistic preferences: the negative weights on ad-
vantageous and disadvantageous deviations from what is considered as the fair benchmark
are such that utility remains strictly increasing in own surplus share. And in contrast to
the original Fehr-Schmidt model, the fair split need not automatically be a 50–50 division;
any price between sellers’ cost and buyers’ willingness to pay may be the one which – for
whatever reasons – is agents’ reference point in a given market. This makes it possible to
consider a more ﬂexible notion of fairness than is usually done. It is in line with cognitive
dissonancetheoryfrompsychologyandthenoteworthyexperimentsofBinmoreetal. (1991)
and Binmore et al. (1993), where subjects who were triggered to play dierent bargaining
equilibria ended up considering very dierent surplus distributions as ‘fair’.3
Apart from agents’ concern with fairness, the investigated model is a simple version of the
bargaining markets investigated by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), Gale (1986a; 1986b)
or Binmore and Herrero (1988): buyers and sellers are randomly divided into pairs. One
randomly selected partner in each match suggests a deal. Rejection dissolves the match
and agents wait to be rematched; successful traders leave the market and new ones enter.
For simplicity, buyers and sellers are considered to be perfectly homogeneous. And all
relevant information – most notably about agents’ preferences – is assumed to be common
knowledge.
Examples of real world markets in which agents can be thought of as interacting loosely as
in our model include housing markets with approximately stationary landlord and tenant
populations, similarly stationary labor markets with individual contracting, consumer-to-
consumer sales of used cars, or direct procurement of dierentiated commodities such as
specialty tea, coee, or wine. Agents in these markets may have an idea about the ‘right’,
‘fair’, or ‘appropriate’ rent, wage, or price which aects their subjective evaluation of a
proposal (irrespective of informational imperfections which we completely leave out of
our model). We show how already a rather weak concern for fairness can give rise to
price stickiness. This fairness eect is predicted to persist over time for the considered
market setting. It provides an explanation for price or wage rigidities that complements the
traditional ones based on imperfect information, menu costs, long-term contracts, or money
illusion(see, e.g., Woodford2002fortheﬁrst, FehrandTyran2001forthelatter, Golosovand
Lucas 2007 for menu cost, and Ball and Mankiw 1994 or Taylor 1999 for general overviews).
2Prominent related models of social preferences include the ones by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness
and Rabin (2002), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) or Falk and Fischbacher (2006).
3AnendogenousnotionoffairnessalsofeaturesprominentlyinBinmore’s(1994,1998)theoryofdistributional
justice. It interprets the human sense of fairness as an ecient means to reach agreements quickly; it has
evolutionary advantages only if it can adapt to changes in actual bargaining strength.3
If the fairness benchmark itself is aected by agents’ market experience, aversion to devi-
ations from the given reference price gives rise to a continuum of possible self-conﬁrming
price conventions. This can explain distinct price levels in fundamentally identical markets.
Interestingly, the scope of history dependence is larger, the less friction is associated with
the rejection of an oer: friction turns out to erode the eects of fairness concern. Similarly,
price stickiness is reduced rather than increased by friction.
We will now introduce the model. The ensuing strategic market equilibrium is studied in
Section 3. We ﬁrst discuss the market price’s response to changes in the ratio of buyers to
sellers for a given reference price, and then investigate the implications of endogenizing the
latter. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
Ourbasicmarket set-upmimicsthatofRubinstein(1989, ModelA):agentscantradeasingle
indivisible good at discrete points of time indexed by t = 0;1;2;::: An agent is either a seller
endowed with one unit of the good that she wishes to sell, or a buyer with at least one
unit of disposable income. The sets of active buyers and sellers have cardinalities B and S,
respectively.
In each period, agents are drawn randomly from the current population and matched with
an agent of opposite type if there is one. For simplicity, the matching technology is assumed
toinvolvenofrictionotherthandelayaftertherejectionofanoer,i.e.,allagentsontheshort
side of the market are matched with certainty.4 Those on the long side of the market each
have the same probability of being matched with any speciﬁc trade partner, independently
of the history of play.
All sellers have a reservation price of zero and all buyers have a reservation price of one.
After being matched, each couple engages in a bargaining session in which either the seller
or the buyer is selected with equal probability to propose a price p 2 [0;1] that shall be paid
by the buyer in exchange for the good. The quoted price amounts to a proposal of how to
split the total monetary surplus of size one which is generated by a trade. The responding
agent can accept or reject the oer. If it is rejected, then the two agents stop bargaining and
both return to the set of active buyers or sellers. If the oer is accepted, then the trade is
carried out and both agents leave the market. In this case, a new pair of seller and buyer is
assumed to arrive to the market, i.e., the number of active agents in the market is presumed
to be constant over time. Intuitively, in case of, e.g., a housing market this amounts to
positing that new apartments are rented at a rate similar to the one at which agents vacate
apartments and start searching for a new one.
4Assuming that agents on the short side of the market are matched with probability  < 1 would make the
expressions below even more cumbersome, without qualitatively dierent ﬁndings.4
All agents of type B or S (buyer or seller) are assumed to have identical von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions which can reﬂect a fairness preference as proposed by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999). In case that an agent never trades, her utility is zero. If an agent of type
i 2 fS;Bg trades, then her utility ui depends on the period t  0 in which the agreement is
reached, the accepted price p 2 [0;1], and also on an exogenous reference price pref 2 [0;1].
This reference price is assumed to be the same for every agent and meant to capture a
common notion of the ‘fair price’ for the good, e.g., the average rent per square meter
published in municipal housing statistics.5
Agentsareassumedtobeaversetowardsdeviationsfromthereferenceprice,i.e.,adeviation
of price and reference price diminishes utility. Positive and negative dierences may be
judged asymmetrically: deviations to one’s own favor (higher price for the seller, lower
price for the buyer) are weighted by a parameter i  0, those to one’s disfavor by i  0.
This would in principle allow utility functions to have a global maximum at the reference
price, leading to an equilibrium in which the agents always agree exactly on that price. To
avoid this trivial case we impose that i 2 [0;1): a seller always prefers a higher price to
a lower price, and a buyer always prefers a lower price to a higher one. Note that utility
remains strictly monotonic in surplus as in Rubinstein and Wolinsky’s original setting, but
agents will now prefer a sure payo to a lottery between two prices with the same expected
value if one price deviates from the reference price to their advantage and the other to their
disadvantage.
Agents have stationary time preferences and discount future utility gains – for simplicity,
by a common factor  2 (0;1). Overall, preferences are assumed to be given by
(1) uS(p;pref;t) = t
p   S(p   pref)+   S(pref   p)+
for sellers and
(2) uB(p;pref;t) = t
1   p   B(pref   p)+   B(p   pref)+
for buyers where (x)+  maxf0;xg. The utility functions are illustrated in Figure 1 (solid
lines) for a trade in the current period. Note that the indicated kinks do not imply kinked
aggregate demand or supply curves: demand is zero for prices which imply negative buyer
utility and then jumps to B. Similarly, aggregate supply drops from S to zero.
The considered preferences coincide with those proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) if
pref = 0:5 and fairness concern applies only to the two agents within a match, not those
outside. We deem the restriction to one’s direct trade partner (as in Brown et al. 2004) a
goodstartingpoint–inparticularformarketswithmanybuyersandsellers. Asanextension
of our analysis one might also consider agents who comparethemselves with, e.g., the entire
5We will brieﬂy point out the eects of allowing distinct reference prices amongst buyers and sellers in
Section 4.5


















Figure 1. Kinked utility functions of seller and buyer with i = i = 0:5 and pref = 0:5
population. As in Ewerhart’s (2004) investigation of two-player Rubinstein bargaining, we
allow other prices than 0:5 to be considered as fair. We will not construct any detailed model
ofthe‘fairprice’andinitiallyconsideritsimplyasgiven. WerefertoBoltonetal. (2003)fora
discussion of the determining roles played by past prices, competitor prices, and production
costs, respectively.6 However, we will later interpret pref as a an endogenous fairness norm,
as suggested by Binmore et al. (1993) and Binmore (1998), and require that its distance to
the actual market outcome cannot exceed an exogenous threshold, which is interpreted as
the maximal tolerated level of cognitive dissonance, in the long run.
3. Analysis of the Model
We will consider only symmetric equilibria in which all buyers and sellers respectively use
the same sequentially rational strategy. These strategies may condition agents’ actions on
the current period t but not the particular history of play or agents’ identities. Denote the
value(orexpectedindirectutility)ofbeingasellerinperiodtbyVS(t),andthevalueofbeing
a buyer in period t by VB(t). Let pB(t) be the price oered in equilibrium by the buyer if he is
selected to make the proposal, and pS(t) the price oered in equilibrium by the seller if she is
to make the proposal. Both are selected with equal probabilities, and so p(t)  1
2(pS(t)+pB(t))
is the average price in the market in period t. When there is no danger of confusion we will
suppress pref or t in agents’ utility functions.
Whichever equilibrium arises, VS(t) + VB(t) < 1 must hold because
uS(p;pref;0) + uB(p;pref;0)  1
6AlsoseeXiaetal. (2004)forasurveyofpsychologicalandsociologicalresearchonpricefairness,andK¨ oszegi
and Rabin (2006) for a model of preferences which depend on an endogenous reference point determined by
rational expectations about outcomes.6
for all p;pref;; 2 [0;1] and  < 1. Therefore, every match must end with a transaction: if
this were not the case, then there would be a period t in which at least one proposer quotes
a price that is rejected in equilibrium. Now the proposer could gain by making a deviating
oer p that satisﬁes uS(p;t) > VS(t + 1) and uB(p;t) > VB(t + 1): any sequentially rational
responder strategy would entail acceptance of this oer.
In equilibrium the buyer will always oer exactly pB = u 1
S (VS(t + 1)) and the seller will
always oer pS = u 1
B (VB(t + 1)) in order to render the respective responder indierent;
these oers will be accepted immediately. Assuming that sellers are on the short side of the
market or both types are equally numerous (S  B), the following equations must hold for
all t:
uS(pB;t) = VS(t + 1) (3)
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(7)
Analogous expressions characterize the strategic market equilibrium if buyers are on the
short side of the market (S > B). We refer to Rubinstein (1989) for details.
3.1. Equilibrium Price. Denote the fraction of buyers in the market by b  B
S+B 2 (0;1).
Equations (3)–(7) have a unique and time-independent solution p(t)  p with three cases
that depend on the level of pref and the other parameters of the model:
p =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > :
[b+(2b(1 )+)S]pref(1 B)+b(1 pref)(1+S)











# if p < pref < ¯ p (b)
[b (2b(1 )+)S]pref(1+B)+b(1 pref)(1 S)
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> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
b(+1) (2b+(2b 1)(1 )p)pref
(1 2)(2b(1 p)+p) if pref  ¯ p (a)
p( p++2)pref+b( p+((1 p)2+2((1 p)2 2p+1)pref)+1)
p((+1)2 (2+1)p)+2b((+1)2(1 p)2 p2) if p < pref < ¯ p (b)
b(2(p (1 p))pref +1) (+1)ppref
(1 2)(2b(1 p)+p) if pref  p (c)
with ¯ p =
b(2 )(1+)
2b(1 +)+(1 ) and p =
b(1 )
2b(1  2+)+(1+):
Figure 2 visualizes this term.
7 The thin solid lines indicate the proposer-speciﬁc prices pS
and pB which give rise to the average market price p. Their respective intersections with
the dotted reference price line coincide with the case boundaries.
7The price formulas shown above apply when S  B, i.e., b = B
B+S  0:5. The expressions in case of b < 0:5 are
symmetric (see the left half of the Figure 2). The above term for case (a) becomes relevant under S  B only if
pref is very high. In particular, Figure 2 actually shows the price arising in case (a) of the solution for S > B.8
In the ﬁrst case, (a), the fair price pref is so high that pB  pS  pref. This means that both
the seller and the buyer would oer a price below the fair price in equilibrium. In the last
case, (c), the fair price pref is so low that pS  pB  pref, and both seller and buyer would oer
a price above the fair price in equilibrium. The intermediate case, (b), with pB < pref < pS
entails that if the seller is to propose a price, she suggests one above the fair price, while if
the buyer is to propose a price, this price will be below the fair price.8
Figure2illustratesthekeyeectoffairnessconcerninamatchingmarket: inaneighborhood
of pref, the equilibrium price is much less sensitive to changes in the buyer-seller ratio than
what would be the case without social preferences, i.e., the price is stickier. More formally,
let
py  p




2b(1   ) + 
betheassociatedequilibriumpriceforstandardpreferenceswithoutfairnessconcern(broken
line in Figure 2).9 We will focus on markets – as characterized by the preference parameters
i, i,  and pref – for which pref arises as the equilibrium price for some fraction of buyers in
the market. We denote this buyer share by ˜ b, i.e., p  
b=˜ b = pref.10 Then the following is true:
Proposition 1. The market price is less sensitive to changes in the fraction b of buyers in the market









     
b=˜ b
Proof. Buyer shares b in a suciently small neighborhood of ˜ b pertain to case (b): sellers
propose a price above pref and buyers propose a price below pref. The derivatives of p and
py with respect to b and evaluated at ˜ b are therefore
@p
@b

















     
b=˜ b
=
((   2)(pref   1)S + (3   2)prefB + (pref   1)S + 4(   1)pref + 2)2
(2   S + (   2)(pref   1)S   2prefB + pref(B + S + B))2 ;
8No further cases arise because pS  pB and 0  p  ¯ p  1. The case boundaries can, of course, also be
expressed in terms of b rather than pref, p, and ¯ p: case (a) holds if b  b, case (b) if b < b < ¯ b, and case (c) if ¯ b  b
with b =
pref(1 B)
(2 )(1 pref)(1+S)+pref(1 B) and ¯ b =
pref(1+B)
(3 2)pref(1+B)+(1 pref)(1 S):
9Again, we only provide explicit expressions for S  B, but analogous statements apply when S > B.
10A fraction ˜ b of buyers which allows pref to be an equilibrium price need not exist, e.g., when  is small and
pref is either very high or low. However, one can check that for any given values of i, i and , there exist an
interval of prices p which would respectively arise in equilibrium for some ˜ b 2 (0;1) provided that pref = p.9
respectively. The range [pref; ¯ pref] of reference prices pref for which ˜ b exists (see fn. 10) can be
identiﬁed by solving
p
   
b=1
2;pref=pref
= pref and p
   
b=1 ;pref=¯ pref
= ¯ pref
because p is increasing in b. It can then be checked numerically that the claimed inequality
holds for any pref 2 [pref; ¯ pref]. 
The driving force for the decreased sensitivity of prices near pref
11 is the local increase in
concavity of the agents’ utility function: price proposals by buyers and sellers that are,
respectively, below and above the reference price ex ante amount to a lottery, towards which
bothagentsareriskaverse. Inordertoavoidthislottery,theyarewillingtoacceptaproposal
(and thereby generate a safe return) which is closer to pref than it would be for agents whose
utility is linear everywhere. Importantly, decreased price sensitivity would also obtain if
the baseline utility were already strictly concave rather than linear in price below and above
pref. Moreover, one could also assume an everywhere dierentiable utility function without
changing our qualitative ﬁndings. For example,







  S + S   (S + S)tanh(c(p   pref))

is smooth and produces the same stickiness as uS for large c > 0 (it converges uniformly to
uS for c ! 1). The aspect of Fehr-Schmidt preferences which is crucial in our context is that
fairness concern increases risk aversion in a neighborhood of the reference price.
When agents have no concern for fairness, the market price responds more to changes in the




(2b   1) + 2b
(2b(1   ) + )3 > 0;
and lim !1
@py
@b = 1. So it is somewhat surprising that the stickiness or decreased sensitivity
of prices near pref in case of i > 0 or i > 0 is larger, the less friction there is: when agents
have concern for fairness, p increases in b by less, the larger is . This even gives rise to a ﬂat
price p  pref for all buyer-seller ratios pertaining to case (b) in the limit  ! 1:
Proposition 2. Suppose that maxfB;S;B;Sg > 0. Then, ﬁrst, there exists some 0 2 (0;1) such
that the market price’s sensitivity to changes in the fraction b of buyers in a neighborhood of ˜ b is




b=b0 converges to zero as  ! 1 for
any b0 pertaining to case (b) of equation (8) (in particular, for b = ˜ b).
11Whilst the strict inequalities in Proposition 1 obviously hold on an entire interval around ˜ b, sensitivity of p
with respect to the buyer-seller ratio need not be reduced at every b: it may locally be greater than for standard
preferences near the boundary between cases (a) and (b), or (b) and (c). The average slope of p over the range
of buyer-seller ratios pertaining to case (b) is, however, always smaller for positive i or i than for i = i = 0.10
Proof. The cross-derivative
@2p
@b@ is very unwieldy, but continuous in . It therefore suces to










(1   pref)(2   S + S)
(b   1)2(B + S   BS + B + S + BS)
< 0:
To see that the second claim is true, note simply that lim!1 p = pref wherever case (b)
applies. 
The economic intuition for this comparative static result is connected to the dierent re-
sponse, as  increases, of the bargaining advantages conferred by (i) being on the short side
of the market and (ii) currently being in the proposer position. To see this, ﬁrst review the
case without fairness concern. For concreteness, consider a situation in which buyers are on
the short side of the market (i.e., b < 0:5). Parameter b directly aects sellers’ continuation
values, which are associated with rejecting an oer: if the current price is turned down, the
seller remains unmatched in the next period with probability 1   b . This creates a bargain-
ing advantage for buyers relative to sellers. Because it varies in b, so does p. The eect
of this advantage is, however, attenuated by the equal distribution of another bargaining
advantage: the right to make the ﬁrst proposal. The value of this temporary ‘monopoly
position’ is decreasing in . So bargaining outcomes become increasingly driven only by the
short sides’s matching advantage. It is true that also this advantage becomes less important
as  increases: waiting for a rematching bothers sellers less and less in absolute terms. But
the asymmetric matching advantage turns out to vanish more slowly than the symmetri-
cally distributed proposer advantage. Hence, prices become more responsive to the buyers’
matching advantage, as parameterized by b.
With fairness concern, the bargaining advantage provided by the right to make the next
proposal becomes more pronounced: sellers still hate accepting a low price, but now they
are even less attracted by the lottery of getting a more decent price (above pref) or facing
the same proposal (below pref) again next period than without fairness concern. An analo-
gous statement applies to buyers. Critically, this (still symmetrically distributed) proposer
advantage no longer vanishes as  ! 1: locally risk averse responders will prefer to accept
a price near the benchmark even though there is the chance to almost immediately make a
counteroer. Agents on the long side must, of course, expect a somewhat greater delay until
they get to make an oer after rejecting a proposal, and so their continuation value is still
lower, the more asymmetric are both population sizes. However, as was also true without
fairness concern, not being rematched immediately becomes less and less of a concern for
large . In the limit, as  ! 1, the matching advantage becomes negligible relative to the
discounting-invariant part of the advantage enjoyed by any agent – from the short side or
the long side of the market – who has been drawn as the current proposer.
12Again, we focus on the case of b  1
2, with an analogous expression applying to b < 1
2.11
3.2. Self-conﬁrming Price Conventions. The reference price was so far treated as exoge-
nously given by, e.g., the equal split considered by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), ocial rental
statistics, or perhaps a recommended retail price. In line with a now sizeable economic
literature, we presumed that agreements which are not in line with this benchmark entail a
subjective penalty. That agents who consider themselves as fair persons attach an additional
cost to concluding unfair deals also broadly ﬁts psychologists’ view. However, psycholog-
ical research on cognitive dissonance in the tradition of Festinger (1957) (see Nail et al. 2004
or Cooper 2007 for recent overviews and, e.g., Akerlof and Dickens 1982 for an economic
perspective on the literature) suggests that agents who stoically bear these costs are not the
only possibility. An agent may rather adjust his notion of fairness, and this is particularly
likely if deals are not even on average in line with her or his current notion of fairness.13
We will therefore consider the possibility of the reference price being endogenous and at least
partially responsive to economic fundamentals. The reference price could, for instance,
plausibly arise as an average of past prices such as ocial rental statistics or depend in a
more complex way on history. It is meant to capture a broadly shared notion of what con-
stitutes a fair deal, which will plausibly be adapted if it should persistently and noticeably
fall out of line with agents’ actual experience.
This variation of the above baseline model ﬁts nicely with Ken Binmore’s (1994, 1998)
theory of distributional justice and the still intriguing experimental ﬁndings of Binmore
et al. (1993). This study investigates the role of focal points in bargaining and highlights that
subjects’ notion of a fair division is no universal constant but rather quite path-dependent.
Speciﬁcally, Binmore et al. ﬁrst made distinct surplus divisions focal to their subjects by
havingthembargainwithdierentcomputerprogramsintheinitialstageoftheexperiment,
one program insisting on 50:50 splits, another one on 75:25 splits, and so on. The subjects
switched between the proposer and responder roles in order to become familiarized with
both perspectives. Then participants who had played the same program were matched
and bargained with each other. The result was that subjects – in fundamentally identical
bargaining situations – agreed on dierent surplus divisions depending on which divisions
they had been conditioned to in the initial stage: the bargaining outcomes clustered around
the respective induced focal division. And, more surprisingly, most subjects ended up
describing the agreements that they had reached as particularly fair. What participants
perceived as fair reﬂected their respective payo experience (also see Binmore et al. 1991).
Adjusting one’s notion of a fair deal in avoidance of prolonged cognitive dissonance is
likely to be subjectively costly itself (see Konow 2000 for a theory of decision making which
investigates this assumption in detail). It is worthwhile to incur the adjustment cost only
13This is analogous, for instance, to car drivers who are outraged by the common 5–10% gasoline price
increase during public holidays with peak demand, but then come to ‘accept’ an altogether higher price level
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Figure 3. Self-conﬁrming price convention pref = 0:5 with i = i = 0:3 and  = 0:95
if the dissonance cost associated with the conclusion of deals that are unfair according to
the current fairness standard is even higher, i.e., if in our context the gap between pref and
the average equilibrium price p is large enough. Denote by   0 the size of the gap
between the current reference price and the market price that agents would still tolerate
rather than adapting their fairness benchmark in line with cognitive dissonance theory.
In other words, agents are assumed to abandon the current reference price pref at some
point in time if p < [pref   ;pref + ]. Such prices pref will be referred to as -unstable. In
contrast, a reference price pref which gives rise to an average equilibrium price p inside the
respective -neighborhood of pref would not be changed; it will be referred to as an -stable
price convention. We will assume the cost of adjustment which is indirectly measured by
parameter  to be small but positive, i.e., we consider  > 0 in the following.
An -stable price pref is self-conﬁrming in the following sense: agents regard pref as fair, this
gives rise to an average market price in an -neighborhood of pref, and this in turn conﬁrms
pref as agents’ reference price. As illustrated in Figure 3, the property of a given reference
price to be self-conﬁrming can be robust to quite sizeable ﬂuctuations in the buyer-seller
ratio. It can be checked that if the tolerable gap between the fair and the equilibrium price
is such that












then any buyer-seller ratio for which the seller and buyer prices are respectively above and
below pref, i.e., any market for which case (b) applies, makes the given pref self-conﬁrming.14
Fairness concern may thus not only give rise to reduced short-run sensitivity of prices, but
it can cause prices to be sticky, i.e., to be insensitive to variations of b in the long run, too.
One can also look at Figure 3 from an alternative perspective. Suppose that the buyer-
seller ratio is ﬁxed at some level within case (b) and one observes an equilibrium price
p 2 [0:5   ; 0:5 + ] as depicted. Then pref = 0:5 would be an -stable price convention for
the given buyer-seller ratio. However, it is not the only one. If, for instance,  is so large as to
satisfy inequality (9) for pref = p and for pref = ¯ p, then any reference price ˜ pref 2 [p; ¯ p] would
be -stable: the monotonicity of the two alternative determinants of min() in pref (namely,
pref=(1   S) and (1   pref)=(1   B)) implies that   min(˜ pref) holds for any p  ˜ pref  ¯ p.
Therefore – recalling min’s construction – any such ˜ pref would be self-conﬁrming. Smaller
thresholds  for the subconscious ‘correction’ of cognitive dissonance, of course, imply a
smaller range of -stable reference prices. But there must still exist an entire interval of
self-conﬁrming price conventions:
Proposition 3. For any b 2 (0;1) and  > 0 there exists a non-empty interval [
ˆ
p; ˇ p]  [p; ¯ p] such
that any p 2 [
ˆ
p; ˇ p] would constitute a self-conﬁrming reference price, i.e., p  
pref=p 2 [p   ;p + ].
Proof. Note that for any b 2 (0;1), there exists a unique p0 2 [p; ¯ p] which is 0-stable, i.e.,
p  
pref=p0 = p0. This can be evaluated as
p0 =
b(S(   2) + S   2)
(B   B   2 + b(4   B + S + 3B + S))   2b(2 + B + S)
from equation (8) case (b). It then follows directly from the continuity of p in pref that
p  
pref=p 2 [p   ;p + ] is satisﬁed for any p in a suciently small neighborhood of p0. 
The only situation which does not create any long-run multiplicity of fair price conventions
would be the one in which adjustments of agents’ fairness notion entails no costs at all and
which therefore involves  = 0. Leaving this possibility of a perfectly ﬂexible (and then
perhaps vacuous) sense of fairness aside, there always exists a continuum of -stable price
conventions for the same market environment. This is an eect of fairness concern that comes
on top of reduced short and long-run sensitivity of prices regarding changes in the buyer-
seller ratio, as discussed earlier. Thinking of independent housing markets in city A and
city B as an example, the observed price levels could dier by as much as ¯ p p even though
bothhaveexactlythesamefundamentals(identicalmarginalcostsandmarginalproductsof
housing, same numbers of active buyers and sellers, identical parameters i, i and ). The
14Given that p is monotone in b, the potential gap between p and pref for case (b) is largest at the case
boundaries. So the expression for min(pref) follows from evaluating jpref   pj at p and ¯ p.14
only dierence would be that, for instance, because the collection of rental statistics initially
had a bias in one but not the other community, cities A and B have dierent reference prices.
These need not necessarily have been self-conﬁrming from the beginning: a very high initial
reference rent in city A will presumably give rise to a relatively high initial market price and
a long-run equilibrium p
A near ¯ p; a low initial one in city B would give rise to p
B near p.15
Echoing the comparative static ﬁndings in Proposition 2, the possible history dependence
caused by fairness concern does not vanish as  ! 1; rather, the range of self-conﬁrming
reference prices becomes larger as  increases:
Proposition 4. For any given  > 0, the size of the interval [
ˆ
p; ˇ p]  [p; ¯ p] such that p  
pref=p 2
[p   ;p + ] holds for every p 2 [
ˆ








p; ˇ p] converges to [p; ¯ p] as  ! 1.




for any pref 2 [p; ¯ p].
The endpoints of interval [
ˆ
p; ˇ p] can be computed by solving p  






p +  for
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@ is again quite unwieldy, but can be shown to be strictly positive
for any b pertaining to case (b) given the restrictions on i, i and  introduced above. 
15We do not want to suggest any particular process of adjustment. As long as it is monotonic in the sense that
the current reference price pref rises (falls) if it is at least  below (above) the induced equilibrium price p and
suciently gradual to involve no big over-shooting, a price convention will be reached near the corresponding
boundary p or ¯ p. Note, however, that such dynamics would have to operate on a much larger time-scale than
the back-and-forth of oers considered in the baseline model. Otherwise it would be inappropriate to assume
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Figure 4. -stable range and equilibrium prices for i = i = 0:3 and   ! 1
This comparative static result can also be interpreted as saying that the tolerable degree
of cognitive dissonance  which suces to give rise to a given interval of -stable price
conventions is smaller, the larger is the discount factor , i.e., the less friction is associated
with rejection of an oer. In the limit of  ! 1, the equilibrium market price p is constant for
the entire range of buyer-seller ratios pertaining to case (b). Then an arbitrarily small  > 0
will render the entire interval [p; ¯ p] self-conﬁrming: any reference price pref 2 [p; ¯ p] implies
an equilibrium in which the actual average price happens to be pref. This is illustrated in
Figure 4. It shows the limit of equilibrium market prices for three dierent reference prices.
For each one, there is a range of buyer shares b which would give rise to it in equilibrium.
So any reference price inside the indicated grey intervals [p; ¯ p] would be self-conﬁrming in
a robust sense: namely, for an interval of buyer shares.
Note that the dierence between the prices proposed in equilibrium by a buyer and by a
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This would simplify to16
(10) p = b  p;
for “standard” preferences with i = i = 0: the limit market price corresponds exactly
to sellers’ market power as measured by the relative abundance of buyers. So the dotted
45-line in Figure 4 illustrates how aversion to unfairly favorable deals (i > 0) and aversion
to unfairly unfavorable deals (i > 0) shift, e.g., a low standard equilibrium price p up
towards pref = 0:5 if buyers are scarce and, analogously, down towards pref = 0:5 if sellers
are scarce.
Thisqualitativeobservationdoesnotrequirethatbothbuyersandsellersareconcernedabout
fairness, and neither that there is aversion against both unfairly favorable and unfavorable
agreements. As illustrated in Figures 5(a) and (b), in order for p to be shifted downwards
in a sellers’ market it is sucient that either S > 0 or B > 0, i.e., sellers suer from
favorable deals or buyers suer from unfavorable deals (relative to the current notion of
a fair price). Similarly, Figures 5(c) and (d) illustrate that the standard equilibrium price
is shifted upwards in a buyers’ market if either buyers subjectively suer from unfairly
favorable deals (B > 0) or sellers exhibit aversion to unfavorable deals (S > 0).
The equilibrium price curves and ranges of self-conﬁrming prices in Figure 4 can be un-
derstood as the superposition of the four components of Figure 5: both aversion against
unfairly favorable deals by the buyer (B > 0) and aversion against unfairly unfavorable
deals on the part of the seller (S > 0), ﬁrst, cause price stickiness in a left neighborhood
of the buyer-seller ratio b = pref and, second, create an entire interval of prices above the
standard equilibrium level p that would remain in place as a self-conﬁrming endogenous
reference price. Analogously, positive levels of S (seller suers from unduly favorable
deals) and positive levels of B (buyer incurs additional subjective costs from paying more
than pref) create price stickiness in a right neighborhood of b = pref and, moreover, allow for
-stable reference prices below the corresponding level of p. The eects of S, B, S, and B
complement one another. As can easily be checked, the magnitude of each such eect grows
monotonically in the corresponding levels i and i. For instance, there is more scope ceteris
16Note that equilibrium prices do not violate the tenet that agents on the short side of the market can
appropriate all surplus. As ﬁrst pointed out by Gale, the ﬂows rather than the stocks of buyers and sellers
need to be considered. Because they are equal in a stationary market, any p 2 [0;1] would be a competitive
equilibrium in our setting whilst only p as characterized by (3)–(7) is also a strategic equilibrium. See Gale






















































Figure 5. Ranges of approx. sustained reference prices for (  ! 1) and pref = 0:5
paribus for a price above the standard level p to be sustained as the self-conﬁrming fair
level, the bigger are B or S.17 Or, for any given current reference price pref, the equilibrium
price exhibits greater downwards stickiness in the sense of responding less when the share
of buyers in the market drops from b = pref, the bigger are B or S. The latter eect will
show itself in the form of a larger interval of buyer shares b that give rise to p = pref. For
instance,
(11) p = pref = 0:5 i b 2
"
1   B
(1   B) + (1 + S)
;
1 + B
(1   S) + (1 + B)
#
;
and it is easily checked that the left endpoint of the interval decreases in B and S, whilst
the right endpoint increases in S and B.
Returning to the stylized example of a stationary housing market, these comparative static
considerations indicate that the scope for persistent price dierences between two struc-
turally identical cities A and B (in particular, involving the same reference-dependent pref-
erences amongst the respective tenants and landlords) is bigger, the more pronounced is
agents’ concern with fairness. Identical average prices should only be expected to arise if





((1 b)(1 B)+b(2 )(1+S))2 > 0 for all feasible parameter constellations.18
4. Concluding remarks
We have obtained three main qualitative results from our analysis of fairness in a stylized
model of decentralized trade. The ﬁrst, very broad ﬁnding may well be the most signiﬁcant
one: fairness concern can be expected to aect equilibrium market prices in a persistent way,
despite the availability of complete contracts and complete information. This prediction
contrasts with most of the experimental literature on behavior in markets – presumably
because it has mainly looked at double auctions so far.
Our second and more speciﬁc ﬁnding is that fairness concern is likely to result in a reduced
sensitivity of prices in response to variations of market fundamentals. Here, we have stud-
ied variations of the buyer-seller ratio, which is a measure of sellers’ market power. We
conjecture that similar results could also be obtained regarding other supply and demand
shocks in a more general model, involving, for instance, heterogeneous reservation prices.
Somewhat surprisingly, price sensitivity to changes in the relative numbers of buyers and
sellers does not increase as the delay between the rejection of an oer and a possible re-
matching vanishes. To the contrary: prices may get sticker, the less friction there is. The
intuitive reason for this is that the bargaining advantage conferred by being on the short
side of the market is linked to agents’ impatience. It decreases, and eventually vanishes,
as agents care less about a given time of delay. In contrast, the symmetrically distributed
advantage of facing a responder who dislikes lotteries involving favorable and unfavorable
deviations from the reference price is not created by discounting, and therefore does not
vanish in the limit.
The third ﬁnding of our analysis concerns the possibility that reference prices are subject to
psychological adaptation. If we posit, as in Ken Binmore’s theory of distributional justice,
that agents’ notion of a fair deal will ultimately adjust if (and only if) it clashes with their
actual, market power-driven bargaining experience in a pronounced way, then dierent fair
price conventions can be associated with the same underlying market fundamentals. We
have investigated the stability condition that the considered way of distributing a monetary
surplus is close enough to the market outcome which would follow if this way was indeed
agents’ fair benchmark. Generally, many prices satisfy this requirement for a ﬁxed market
conﬁguration. Hence,asenseoffairnesswhichadjuststocognitivedissonance,thatpossibly
is implied by market fundamentals, will give rise to multiple self-conﬁrming long-run
equilibria.
The history dependence and price stickiness predicted for our very stylized stationary
market can have important practical implications, and provide explanations for several
real-world phenomena. In particular, fairness concern creates the potential to inﬂuence
market prices by ‘soft’ policy measures: non-binding recommended retail prices published by
producers possibly establish common reference points for consumers and retailers. They19
can be expected to induce retail market clearing at prices nearby – and moreover to reduce
the sensitivity of prices in response to demand or supply ﬂuctuations.18 Analogously,
government policies such as the (lagged) publication of rent indices – which is common,
for instance, in German municipalities – may have persistent and noticeable eects: even
though landlords and tenants are generally free to deviate from the indicated price per area
unit, the ocial ﬁgures provide a powerful benchmark; negotiators commonly point out
reasons for why a lease should involve dierent terms. Similarly, compulsory minimum
wages may have an economically relevant eect even after they have ceased to be a binding
constraint. This has recently been documented in the laboratory by Falk et al. (2006).
Of course, our results call for more research. First, the model itself should be varied and
generalized,withthegoalofevaluatingtherobustnessofourﬁndings. Preliminaryattempts
to relax the presumption that all agents in the market consider the same reference price their
benchmark suggest that the model is very robust at least to some variations. One can, for
example, assume that reference prices are identical for all agents on one side of the market
(namely, pi
ref for i 2 fB;Sg), but dierent from those on the other side (i.e., pB
ref , pS
ref). This
gives rise to the same kind of reduced price sensitivity which we have deduced for the fully
homogenous case, except that prices are now sticky around both the buyers’ reference price
pB
ref and the sellers’ reference price pS
ref – corresponding to two disjoint intervals IB and IS of
buyer-seller ratios with markedly reduced sensitivity to variations of b 2 Bi. In the limit, as
 ! 1, equilibrium prices again become perfectly ﬂat inside IB and IS with a transition zone
in between, where p has a slope close to unity.
Second, it would be desirable to investigate the predictions of the model empirically – in
the ﬁeld or, often allowing sharper targeting, by laboratory experiments. Reﬂecting the
three main qualitative ﬁndings, a ﬁrst testable hypothesis is that dierent reference prices –
induced, for instance, by the framing of the experiment, or by initially allowing prices to
settleatsomelevelandthenvaryingthenumberofbuyersandsellers–produceasigniﬁcant
treatment eect. A second one is that the sensitivity of outcomes with respect to sellers’ (or
buyers’) market power varies according to the three qualitative cases captured by equation
(8) and, moreover, by how close the original price level was to the induced reference price.
Finally,providedthatstickinessaroundaninducedbenchmarkcanindeedbeobserved,how
does this vary with agents’ incentives to avoid delay? Does friction indeed erode the eects
of fairness in bargaining markets? Investigation of these issues should require neither a
market that is literally stationary, nor particularly large buyer and seller populations. In our
view, a lot would already be gained by giving up the double auction paradigm for market
experiments.
18Let us emphasize again that we have adopted a rather broad notion of fairness. We understand it as a
common benchmark for the participants of a given market, as, e.g., the dierent local crop sharing conventions
in the study of Young and Burke (2001). Consumers may not consciously attribute any fairness properties to the
recommended retail price of an umbrella – until an opportunistic vendor starts exceeding it during heavy rain.References 20
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